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Given the spate of studies seeking to elaborate a theology of reli-
gions that have appeared over the last five years, it is evident that the 
question of the "many religions," like that of the "many poor," is one of 
the issues that most disturb, and therefore can most invigorate, Christian 
consciousness. In what follows, I would like to review and analyze what 
I think are some of the pivotal issues in Christian efforts to come to a 
clearer, more adequate and coherent, understanding of other religions 
and of Christianity in the light of other faiths. 
It seems to me that the central issue, around which most of the other 
questions within a Christian theology of religions gravitate, is whether 
the Christian community, having clearly made the move from what has 
been called the "exclusivity" to the "inclusivist" model, can now take 
the further step to what some have called the "pluralist" model for a 
theology of religions. (As is evident, I am speaking here mainly about the 
mainline Christian churches; most fundamentalist Christians prefer to 
pitch their tent in the "exclusivist" camp.) 
For the sake of clarity, let me briefly define these terms. The 
inclusivist model represents both the official teaching of the Roman 
Catholic magisterium and, somewhat ambiguously, statements of the 
World Council of Churches, and reflects the sensus communis among 
Roman Catholic and mainline Protestant theologians. It affirms the 
value and dignity of all religious paths, and the urgent need to dialogue 
with them, but attributes to Christ and Christianity (either within the 
course of history or at its final outcome) an ultimacy and normativity 
meant to embrace and fulfill all other religions. Inclusivists approach 
other believers with a genuine respect and a sincere desire to learn, but 
feel that because of the historical fact of Jesus Christ, they have the final 
word. I should point out, however, that theologians who hold to this 
model, do so not just for internal reasons of fidelity to the Christian fact 
and to traditional teaching, but also for external, philosophical reasons 
arising out of the way we know truth and search for it with others. All 
profitable conversations, they point out, are based on certain decisive 
claims. Christians make their decisive claims on the basis of the incarna-
tional reality of Jesus Christ. 
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Pluralist theologians, in an effort both to promote a more authentic 
dialogue among religions and a more faithful interpretation of the Gos-
pel in our age of religious pluralism, recognize the equal rights and 
possible parity of all religions and therefore eschew any final or absolute 
expression of truth. In taking this stance, pluraliste do not claim, as they 
are often misunderstood to do, that such a parity actually exists among 
religions, but only that it can exist By parity, pluraliste for the most part 
mean not that all religions are saying the same thing or that there is a 
common core within them all, but that many religions may have equally 
meaningful and valid messages for humankind and that it may be the 
case that no one religion has the final or normative word for all the 
others. 
I would now like to summarize and comment on four issues which, 
if more clearly confronted and more thoroughly discussed, can make for 
either clearer divisions or greater resolution between inclusivists and 
pluralists. I should add that I do so as a pluralist who is still searching for 
a clearer path and who, therefore, stands in need of greater dialogue and 
challenge from the broader theological community. 
I. Is Pluralism a Primary or Secondary Good? 
What think ye of pluralism? Is the manyness of things, especially of 
religions, a good in itself, a good to which other goods must be subor-
dinated? Such questions point to a foundational, though often subcon-
scious, issue that determines different ways of responding to the reality 
of many religions. Is the diversity of religions a provisional or an 
ultimate good? Is it something we have to accept and struggle with in 
order to move on to something else, something higher or better? Or is it 
something that, while we will be enriched in accepting and struggling 
with it, will never be removed? Such questions raise deep, ontological 
issues: are diversity and complexity part of the very stuff of reality, the 
way things work? At the same time, these are theological issues: what is 
the ultimate, God-intended state of affairs? Is it to be a oneness of 
religion in which, while there will be differences, such differences will 
be secondary and will be subsumed into a higher unity? Does God intend 
oneness to have the final word over manyness? 
The inclusivists' response to these questions would tend to see 
oneness as the hoped-for eschatological state of affairs: the many reli-
gions will ultimately be brought into an all-inclusive, fulfilling unity. In 
this unity, of course, that which is true and good in other religions (as 
Vatican II has it) will be preserved and fulfilled; but this fulfillment, this 
attainment of true identity, can take place only within the revelation of 
Jesus Christ, as that revelation has been carried on within Christian 
tradition. The inclusivists, as I understand them, would argue that such 
an affirmation of ultimate oneness is part and parcel of the Christian 
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story; in light of the revelation given them in Jesus Christ, this is the way 
followers of the Nazarean understand the world and history. 
As expected, the pluralists propose an opposite response and 
suggest that there will always be many, that there will never be a final 
solution or a final oneness. Yes, they hold that ever-greater unity among 
peoples and religions is possible and necessary, but in their view, such 
unity will not constitute a final state of integration. There will indeed be 
ever new relationships, but they will increase, not decrease, real differ-
ences. Whitehead's axiom seems to neatly reflect the ontological prefer-
ences of pluralists: the many become one and are increased by one. 
For the pluralists, this is not merely a philosophical assertion. They 
hold to the ontological priority of manyness, not only because of what 
they see in the world, but also because of their Christian faith. Counter-
ing the inclusivists' theological arguments, the pluralists would hold 
that when John's Jesus announces that "I will that they might be one," he 
does not mean any other kind of "oneness" than that which exists 
between himself and his Parent—a oneness that does not destroy 
genuine and irreducible differences. Some pluralists, therefore, root 
their preference for manyness in the way Christians experience and 
speak about the ultimate—that is, in the trinitarian mystery. As Raimon 
Panikkar states: "The mystery of the Trinity is the ultimate foundation 
for pluralism." Just as the experience of and belief in the Trinity affirms a 
radical, irreducible pluralism within the Godhead so too does it ground 
a similar pluralism as the very stuff and dynamic of finite reality. In other 
words, divine pluralism ad intra makes for finite pluralism ad extra. 
This means, in Panikkar's words, that "reality itself is pluralistic "* 
Therefore, just as God cannot be reduced to a unity that would remove 
irradicable differences, so too the world of religions forbids any notion 
of unity that would do away with the real differences among the various 
traditions. 
II. Is Dialogue a Primary or Secondary Good? 
Questions dealing with the ultimate value of dialogue itself also 
touch on the hidden presuppositions or criteria that determine how one 
sees or judges issues in the theology of religions. I suspect that one's 
attitude towards the value of dialogue determines one's proclivity 
toward inclusivism or pluralism. For myself, it was only through the 
staunch criticism that I received about my book No Other Name?2 that I 
realized how much this question determines my own way of perceiving. 
Raimundo Panikkar, "The Jordan, the Tiber, and the Ganges: Three Kairological 
Moments of Christie Self-Consciousness" in John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, eds., The Myth 
of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis, 1987), 110. 
2Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes toward 
World Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1985). 
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Just how important is dialogue for us? Within the world of finite 
goods, is it a primary or secondary good—that is, is it a good which, for 
the most part, cannot be sacrificed for other goods? Or, should one be 
ready to lay dialogue on the altar for the sake of higher goods? Notice 
that in posing this question, I am not calling dialogue an "ultimate" 
good. I have realized the dangers invoked by those liberals who insist on 
"keeping the conversation going at any cost." With Dorothée Soelle, I 
recognize that there are limits to tolerance and there comes a time when 
the conversation becomes not just futile but dangerous. This is espe-
cially the case when dialogue or an extolling of pluralism becomes an 
ideological tool for the maintenance of oppressive, socio-economic 
structures.3 Justice remains a higher ethical value than dialogue. 
Perhaps I can more clearly state what I am getting at in terms of a 
rather heated discussion going on among missionaries and mis-
siologists, as exemplified in questions which Cardinal Tomko recently 
raised in regard to some of the newer theologies of religion. He 
suggested that dialogue must never get in the way of evangelization— 
that it must take a second place to the task of seeking conversions. If 
certain understandings of other religions and of what it takes to dialogue 
with them in any way jeopardize the "higher good" of evangelizing, 
then these theologies must be abandoned.4 
In a certain sense, I agree with the Cardinal: evangelization is 
essential to living out the Christian message. If Christians gives up the 
task of announcing the good news, with the intent to persuade others 
that it is genuinely good, then Christianity has lost not only its fiber but 
its very soul. Yet I would want to suggest to the Cardinal that if he thinks 
there is a contradiction between evangelization and genuine dialogue 
with other religions, the problem cannot simply be resolved in favor of 
evangelization, as if dialogue were a subordinate good. Rather, I would 
argue that because Jesus' "new commandment" to love our neighbor 
takes precedence over the "missionary commandment" to evangelize 
our neighbour, so too dialogue holds a primacy in our dealings with 
other people. We cannot follow Christ and his commandment to love our 
neighbor unless we are genuinely open to authentic dialogue with 
others. Respecting and authentically listening to others is part of loving 
them. There cannot, therefore, be a contradiction between authentic 
dialogue and authentic evangelization. If there are tensions between the 
two, the solution must come not through facile subordination but 
through careful integration. 
3Dorothee Soelle, Strength of the Weak: Toward a Christian Feminist Identity 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984), 66. See also the soon to be published study of Mark 
Kline Taylor that seeks to balance theological concern for pluralism with that for domina-
tion and oppression: Remembering Esperanza; Λ Cultural-Political Theology for North 
American Praxis (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1990), ch. 1. 
4Cardinal Josef Tomko, "Missionary Challenges to the Theology of Salvation," 
Omnis Terra (Pontifical Missionary Union), December, 1988, 541-53. 
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"Authentic dialogue" is a high-sounding term that can be thrown 
around to hide fuzzy thinking. What is this "dialogue" which is so 
valuable? Certainly, to really converse or dialogue with someone does 
not mean that we have to agree with, or even tolerate, everything we hear 
from them. As already stated, especially in matters dealing with justice 
and oppression, authentic dialogue will often require us to disagree, to 
take strong contrary positions, maybe even to take steps to prevent our 
partners from acting on what they hold to be true. 
But before we can come to such options of opposition, we have to 
have conversed with our partners. Without laying out rules for dialogue, 
I suspect that most people would agree that there are indeed certain 
"conditions for the possibility" of genuine conversation: we must really 
listen to each other, honestly speak our mind to each other, and be ready 
to change our views and our practices in the light of our conversation. 
Whatever prevents such conditions, prevents dialogue. 
Most pluralists regard dialogue as a "primary good"—not absolute, 
but certainly primary to, for instance, clear doctrinal claims or tradi-
tional methods of evangelization. The orthopraxis of dialogue takes 
precedence, for the most part, over the orthodoxy of clear or "unchang-
ing" beliefs. Pluralists take this position not only as philosophers who 
hold that communicative praxis is essential to the pursuit of truth, but 
also as followers of Jesus Christ who believe that they cannot really love 
their neighbors unless they listen Jp and respect—that is, dialogue 
with—them. So pluralist theologians would argue that whatever does 
not promote the spirit of dialogue is not according to the Spirit of Jesus 
Christ. And in the spirit of dialogue they would suggest to their 
inclusivist colleagues that the inclusivist model, which requires one to 
enter the dialogue with the conviction and claim that one possesses a 
God-given final and normative word, is an obstacle to dialogue. This 
criticism is not saying that one should not enter the conversation with 
clear ideas and bold claims, convinced that one's own view of things is 
closer to the truth than one's partner's; on the contrary, such is the stuff 
of dialogue. But this criticism is saying that when one believes that one's 
truth is given by God as final and normative over all others, the dialogue 
will never get off the ground, for one will never be able to really listen to 
and be challenged by what one's partner is saying. To do so would mean 
being unfaithful to God's final word. 
Whether pluralists are correct in these criticisms, and what is the 
nature and value of authentic dialogue, is one of the pivotal issues the 
discussion of which will clarify the content of the Christian theology of 
religions. 
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III. How is Jesus Unique? 
As William Thompson has said in a recent essay in Horizons, the 
question of the uniqueness of Christ "is one of the more burning issues, if 
not the burning issue, in christology today."5 Notice, we are asking not 
whether but how Jesus is unique. I recognize that it is of the essence of 
Christianity to affirm and proclaim the uniqueness of Jesus; and by 
uniqueness, I and other pluralists certainly mean more than just the 
uniqueness that characterizes every human being in her or his distinct 
individuality and gifts. But just how is Jesus unique—and how are 
Christians to proclaim His uniqueness? This is another question that 
divides inclusivists and pluralists and that calls for more intense discus-
sion. 
The inclusivists' understanding of how Jesus is unique is well 
known and need not be summarized here; it has been neatly articulated 
and defended in the already mentioned essay by William Thompson. As 
the title of Thompson's essay makes clear, to proclaim that Jesus is 
unique is to affirm before all peoples and religions that He is unsurpass-
able and final. As Karl Rahner has amply argued, the uniqueness of 
Jesus is both qualitatively and quantitatively different from that of all 
other religious figures. He is God's ultimate and normative word for all 
other truth. There can be no other religious truth that is not already 
contained, at least implicitly, in the revelation given in Jesus Christ. 
Other religions, while they are to be fulfilled and included in Christ, are 
incomplete and unfulfilled without Him. 
The pluralists are searching for a new understanding of the unique-
ness of Christ that will be both appropriate to Christian tradition and 
adequate to respond to the new experience of religious pluralism. If the 
inclusivists interpret the uniqueness of Jesus in terms of finality and 
unsurpassability, the pluralists view Jesus' uniqueness as a statement of 
the universality and indispensability of His message and mission. I 
trust that this would be a proper statement of the christological position 
that a number of theologians, Catholic and Protestant, are presently 
seeking to elaborate; among them are Rosemary Radford Ruether, 
Raimon Panikkar (since the early '70s), John Hick, Leonard Swidler, 
Aloysius Pieris, Felix Wilfred, Michael Amaladoss, Stanley Samartha, 
Tom Driver, Seiichi Yagi, and Edward Schillebeeckx (only recently).6 
5
 William M. Thompson, "Jesus' Unsurpassable Uniqueness: A Theological Note," 
Horizons 16 (1989): 101. 
6
 See the essays of Ruether, Panikkar, Hick, Samartha, Driver, Yagi, Pieris in Hick and 
Knitter, eds., The Myth of Christian Uniqueness; Michael Amaladoss, "Faith Meets Faith," 
Vidyajyoti 49 (1985): 109-17, and "Dialogue and Mission: Conflict or Convergence?" 
Vidyajyoti 50 (1986): 62-86; Felix Wilfred, "Dialogue Grasping for Breath? Towards New 
Frontiers in Interreligious Dialogue," Federation of Asian Bishops Papers, No. 49 (1987), 
35-52; Leonard Swidler, "Interreligious and Interideological Dialogue: The Matrix for all 
Systematic Reflection Today" in Leonard Swidler, ed., Toward a Universal Theology of 
98 HORIZONS 
While a pluralist christology does not insist that Jesus Christ is 
absolute and final, it does continue to hold—contrary to widespread 
misunderstanding—that Jesus is universal and decisive. Or, as recently 
suggested by Richard Viladesau, though pluralist Christians may be 
hesitant to claim that Jesus is unsurpassable, they can and must con-
tinue to affirm Him as indispensable.7 In other words, pluralists are not 
saying that Jesus is Savior "just for us," or "just for Christians or Wester-
ners." Nor are they suggesting that the Buddha is just as good as, or the 
same as, Jesus. Such relativistic pap is the deathknoll of both personal and 
religious commitment and of interreligious dialogue, and is recognized 
as such by most pluralists. For them, even though they do not feel able, 
on either biblical or philosophical grounds, to proclaim to the world that 
the message of Jesus contains the full and final word on divine truth, 
they do continue to claim, with integrity, that what has been revealed in 
Jesus Christ is of universal relevance for all peoples and all times and 
that to know Him is to be called to decisions that radically affect, and 
even redirect, one's way of being in the world. 
Edward Schillebeeckx, who in a recent essay seems to have given 
his christology a much more pluralist slant, states clearly the difference 
between universality and finality. On the one hand, he staunchly affirms 
that universality is essential to the Christian witness to Jesus; if this is 
lost, so is the gospel and Christian identity. For "the essential bond 
between the coming of the Reign of God for all people and Jesus the 
Christ is confessed in all levels and traditions of the New Testament, 
even by the first Hebrew-Jewish interpretation of Jesus of Nazareth. ' ' Yet 
Schillebeeckx also insists that universality does not mean absoluteness 
or superiority over all other expressions of truth. In other words, the 
Christian conviction that Jesi^s offers "the definitive and decisive revela-
tion of God" does not necessarily mean that "that revelation then is 
normative for other religions." Schillebeeckx evidently understands 
"definitive and decisive" in such a way as not to rule out equally defin-
itive and decisive revelations elsewhere. So he bemoans the historical 
and present-day fact that "a proper claim to universality was twisted 
imperialistically into an ecclesiastical claim of absoluteness. " Signaling 
his own pluralistic turn, he then rejoices that "at the moment, Christian-
ity is not dropping its claim to universality, but is letting go both its 
exclusivist and inclusivist claim to universality."8 
In such a pluralist christology, Jesus remains unique insofar as he 
offers a revelation that is universally relevant, indispensable, and deci-
Religion (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987), 32-45; Edward SchilleSeeckx, "The Religious and 
the Human Ecumene" in Marc E. Ellis and Otto Maduro, eds., The Future of Liberation 
Theology: Essays in Honor of Gustavo Gutierrez (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1989), 177-86. 
7Richard Viladesau, Answering for Faith: Christ and the Human Search for Salvation 
(New York: Paulist, 1987), 242-45. 
»Schillebeeckx, 179-80, 182. 
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sive. But such a christology is ready to recognize other revelations as 
analogously unique. There could be, as William Thompson suggested, a 
"complementary uniqueness" between Jesus and the Buddha.9 
Are such pluralistic christologies valid? What are the criteria by 
which they should be evaluated? Here, I suggest, we have another focal 
issue for future discussions among Christian theologians of religions: 
how to develop a christological criteriology. More precisely, is it possi-
ble to reconcile the new pluralistic views with the clearly exclusivist or 
inclusivist New Testament language about Jesus? Is there any validity to 
the pluralists* proposals that such language belongs more to the medium 
than to the central content of New Testament christology? Should the 
New Testament language about Jesus, together with conciliar and doctri-
nal language, be understood more as performative language calling 
people to a particular way of acting, rather than metaphysical language 
making absolute claims about the nature and ontological status of Jesus 
Christ? Such questions are as complex as they are necessary for clarify-
ing a theology of religions. 
TV. How to Maintain a Fruitful and Faithful Balance Between 
Particularity and Universality? 
The christological question contains and exemplifies the broader 
question within any Christian theology of religions concerning how to 
maintain the necessary dipolarity between particularity and univer-
sality—that is, between commitments and fidelity to the gospel on the 
one hand and genuine openness to other religions on the other. This 
broader issue manifests two sides: ad intra, pertaining to Christian life 
and praxis, and ad extra, pertaining to the requirements for dialogue. 
Ad Intra 
A pivotal point of difference between Roman Catholic inclusivists 
such as Avery Dulles, Hans Küng, Franz Josef van Beeck, and Gregory 
Baum and pluralists such as Raimon Panikkar, Leonard Swidler, and 
myself is located in the inclusivists* concern that the new views of other 
religions, and especially the new pluralist christologies, offend against 
the lex orandi (the rule of prayer) and, if I may coin a term, the lex 
prophetizandi (the rule of prophecy).10 The inclusivists warn that the 
9William M. Thompson, The Jesus Debate (New York: Paulist, 1985), 388-93. He 
"corrects" (I would also say, "retracts") this position in his Horizons essay cited in note 5. 
10
 Avery Dulles, The Resilient Church: The Necessity and Limits of Adaptation (Gar-
den City, NY: Doubleday, 1977), 78; Hans Küng, "Toward an Ecumenical Theology of 
Religions: Some Theses for Clarification," Concilium 183 (1986): 119-25; Franz Josef van 
Beeck, Christ Proclaimed: Christology as Rhetoric (New York: Paulist, 1979), 389; Gregory 
Baum, "The Grand Vision: It Needs Social Action" in Anne Lonergan and Caroline 
Richards, eds., Thomas Berry and the New Cosmology (Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third, 1987), 
4. 
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pluralists so stress the universality of God's truth and revelation and 
they so dilute the centrality and finality of Jesus that Christians will no 
longer be able to worship Christ and sustain their commitment to Him 
(the lex orandi), nor will they have the resoluteness and certainty to 
carry out their prophetic role of standing up to the sinful structures of the 
world and criticizing the powers and dominations in the name of Christ 
(the lex prophetizandi). Going right to the heart of the Christian message 
and mission, this is a serious criticism. If it is true, any Christian 
pluralists would have to, in conscience and in fidelity to the theological 
task, abandon her or his position. 
The pluralists offer a pastoral response that is as deep-reaching as is 
the inclusivists ' criticism. They suggest that a pluralistic understanding 
of Christ and Christianity that affirms the revelation given in Christ to be 
decisive and universal but not absolute and final—which in other words 
sees Jesus as God's authentic though not only Word—can ground an 
even deeper and more mature Christian faith and commitment. Genuine 
human growth and commitment is fostered not by supplying people 
with a one-and-only, absolute truth which they know surpasses all other 
truth, but, rather, by offering them a vision and confidence by which 
they can carry on the pursuit of truth. As John Dunne tells us, we are 
truly freed and are truly held in the hands of God when we perceive our 
life not as a pursuit of certainty but as a pursuit of ever-greater under-
standing.11 In the past, ministers and teachers have improperly led the 
Christian faithful to believe that they can be committed to Jesus Christ 
only if he is the "one and only," or only if he provides "the highest or 
unsurpassable truth.,, It seems to me that to demand "absolute truth" or 
an "absolute Savior" before one can offer one's "absolute commitment" 
is to demand what is humanly impossible, psychologically damaging, 
and theologically suspect. Reflecting on a biblical scene, perhaps we can 
surmise that before the future disciples could "come and follow, and 
eventually die for Jesus," they indeed had to see and be convinced that 
He was truly "the Christ, the Son of the Living God," but not that he was 
the only Son of God (Mt 16:15-16). 
As Langdon Gilkey has prophetically pointed out, Christians living 
in a world of historical consciousness and religious pluralism are sum-
moned to live out a paradox in their following of Christ: they are called to 
be absolutely committed to truth even though they recognize that such 
truth is relative. They are to be fully committed to the truth of Christ— 
also to the point of laying down their lives for that truth—even when 
they realize that this truth may not be the whole truth about ultimate 
reality. Though limited, though perhaps eventually to be completed by 
other truths, the gospel still can call forth our total response. The follow-
11
 John S. Dunne, The Way of All the Earth (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 38-49. 
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ing of Christ is precisely that—an adventurous following, not a secure 
possession.12 
Ad Extra 
In reaching ad extra and approaching followers of other paths, 
Christian theologians of religions are called upon to achieve a balance 
between universality and particularity that will protect them from both 
relativism and imperialism. As the antifoundationalist philosophers 
would put it, any good theology of religions should be haunted by the 
Cartesian anxiety—the fear of either forcing one's views on others or of 
not having anything worthwhile to say to them. 
Both inclusivists and pluralists are accused of not properly main-
taining this balance. The inclusivists, with their claims of possessing a 
universal norm in Christian revelation, are exposed to accusations of 
foundationalism and imperialism—of passing judgment on other reli-
gions with standards of truth that these religions do not recognize and 
that have been fashioned solely within the Christian world of discourse. 
The pluralists, for their part, are exposed to a double criticism. From the 
inclusivists, they are accused of relativism—of losing hold of the par-
ticularity of Jesus Christ and the gospel, of making Jesus just "one among 
many." And from antifoundationalist philosophers and often from other 
religious believers, they are accused of an "anonymous imperialism." In 
all their fine talk about universal openness, and about not giving any 
viewpoint a privileged position, in their efforts to place the universal 
divine mystery, and not the particular Jesus, in the center of the religious 
universe, pluralists are naive; they are not sufficiently aware that no one 
can be a pure universalist, that we always judge the whole from our 
particular perspective. There is no common, neutral ground between or 
above the religions. We are always judging others, whether we like it or 
not, according to our own standards of truth. So critics of the so-called 
theocentric (pluralist) approach to other religions ask: when the 
pluralists place God, and not Jesus, in the center of the universe of 
religions, whose God are they talking about? 
So the problem or question that needs to be discussed is this: on the 
one hand, how can we maintain commitment to our Christian convic-
tions and world view and so have something distinctive to contribute to 
the dialogue, but also, on the other hand, how can we at the same time 
really listen to others and not see or judge them according to our pre-
established convictions? How can we, in other words, be fully com-
mitted to Christ but at the same time fully open to the mirabilia Dei that 
may be offered to us in other religions? 
12Langdon Gilkey, "Plurality and Its Theological Implications" in Hick and Knitter, 
eds., The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, 46-48. 
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There are no easy answers to these questions because, I believe, 
there is no one absolute truth given to any particular religion, nor is there 
any preestablished common ground among them that can be known 
before the conversation. Rather, if there is any common hermeneutical 
ground on which religious believers can understand and criticize each 
other, it can be and must be discovered and created within the dialogue 
itself. But such a claim raises a further question: where and how to find 
or form such common ground? 
As I have recently suggested, one promising and effective starting 
point for the shared search for common ground and for the shaky foun-
dations on which the religions might understand and pass judgment on 
each other can be found—I would want to say must be found—in the 
common problems that face all religions and all cultures: the realities of 
human and ecological suffering, injustice and oppression, the threat of 
nuclear war.13 These are issues that all religious believers not only can 
but must recognize as part of a truly "common human experience' ' and 
common human responsibility—a responsibility which they feel not 
only as human beings but on the basis of what seems to make up the 
experience and vision of all the religious traditions of the world. A 
shared concern for and conversion to the victims of this world—and to 
the victimized world itself—can (must?) provide the context and start-
ing point for a fruitful and salvific dialogue among the religions of the 
world. 
These, then, might be some of the fruitful, though complex, ques-
tions that Christian theologians can pursue in future conversations and 
efforts to fashion a theology of religions faithful both to the gospel and to 
the faith and experience of other believers: What kind of value do we 
really place on pluralism and dialogue? Does the uniqueness of Jesus 
reside in finality or in universality? How can we maintain both commit-
ment to the particularity of Jesus Christ and to the universality of what 
we believe to be God's saving and revealing presence? 
13Paul F. Knitter, "Dialogue and Liberation: Foundations for a Pluralist Theology of 
Religions," The Drew Gateway 58 (1988): 1-53. 
